In the present paper the idea of Wang [G.J. Wang, Theory of truth degrees of formulas in Łukasiewicz n-valued propositional logic and a limit theorem, Sci. China Inform. Sci. E 35(6) (2005) 561-569 (in Chinese)] is firstly extended to the n-valued R 0 -logic L Ã n and the concept of truth degrees of formulas in L Ã n is proposed. A limit theorem saying that the truth function s n induced by truth degrees converges to the integrated truth function s when n converges to infinity is obtained. This theorem builds a bridge between discrete valued R 0 -logic and continuous valued R 0 -logic. Secondly, based on deduction theorem, completeness theorem and the concept of truth degrees of formulas in L Ã n , the concept of consistency degrees of theories is given. It is proved that a theory C over L Ã n is a useless theory(i.e., the deductions of C are all tautologies) iff the consistency degree consist n (C) of C is equal to 1, C is consistent iff 1 2 6 consist n ðCÞ 6 1, and C is inconsistent iff consist n (C) = 0. Lastly, the concept of consistency degrees of theories is generalized and a method of graded reasoning in L Ã n is obtained.
Introduction
Whether a theory (i.e., a set of formulas) is consistent or not is one of the crucial questions in any logic system. The reason is that in classical logic, a contradictory theory (i.e., a theory which is not consistent) proves anything. The same result also holds in fuzzy and many-valued logic systems in which the interpretation of the logical implication satisfies 0 ! x = 1, where 0, x, and 1 are truth values [4] . Moreover, how to measure the extent to which a theory is consistent is also one of the crucial questions in logic systems. For trying to grade the extent of consistency of different theories, many authors have proposed different methods in fuzzy (continuous valued) logic systems and have obtained many good results [3, 7, 13, 21, 19, 20, 17] . Especially in [20] , the authors, from logical point of view and based on deduction theorems, completeness theorems and the concept of truth degrees of formulas, introduced, in classical and fuzzy propositional logic systems, a more natural and reasonable definition of consistency degrees of theories. In other words, we have studied successfully the consistency of theories where the set of truth values jumped from {0, 1} to [0, 1] . A natural question then arises: How do we harmoniously fill in the gap of consistency of theories between classical and fuzzy logic systems? That is to say, how do we establish the concept of consistency degrees of theories in n-valued logic systems such that it approximates the consistency of theories in fuzzy logic system when n turns to infinity, and it takes the classical case as a special case when n = 2?
In order to put fuzzy reasoning on a solid foundation, the second author proposed in 1997 a new formal deductive system L Ã (also called R 0 -logic) and a kind of new algebraic structures, called R 0 -algebras (see [12, 14] ). To formalize the logic of nilpotent minimums, Esteva and Godo introduced in 2001 a nilpotent minimum logic, NM for short (NM is a schematic extension of the Monoidal t-norm based logic, MTL for short, as the logic of left-continuous t-norms, see [1] ). So far the authors of [8, 6] have proved that NM and L Ã are equivalent and NM-algebras and R 0 -algebras are the same algebraic structures. It is proved also that L Ã is standard complete [10] (or see [1] for the standard completeness of NM) and the n-valued R 0 -logic L Ã n is also complete with respect to the standard n-valued R 0 -algebra R n (see [11] ). Moreover, the R 0 -logic L Ã has another good property that the structure of its generalized deduction theorem (C [ {A} ' B iff C ' A 2 ! B, see Theorem 2.4) is decided. Therefore we try to choose the n-valued R 0 -logic L Ã n to answer the question above. As we will see from the paper, the presented results can be easily adapted also to each finite-valued Łukasiewicz logic, Ł n for short, which is standard complete with respect to the standard MV n -chain [2] .
The present paper is arranged like this: In Section 2, we recall the presentation of the nvalued R 0 -logic L Ã n including syntax and semantics, and deduction theorem and completeness theorem. In Section 3, we, based on the measure theory on the set X n of all valuations from the set F(S) of all formulas into the set of truth values, introduce the concept of truth degrees of formulas in L Ã n as done in Łukasiewicz n-valued logic system [15] . With the concept of truth degrees of formulas, we propose successfully in Section 4, the concept of consistency degrees of theories after taking on a deep analysis on what it means for a theory to be inconsistent. The idea of the present paper has a good intuitive meaning, and it can be easily generalized by replacing the contradiction 0 with a general formula A to establish a method of graded reasoning in L Ã n . We will discuss this issue in Section 5. The last part, Section 6, is some conclusion summarizing the results and outlining problems and further research topics.
Preliminaries
First let us recall the formal deduction system L Ã (also called R 0 -logic) proposed by the second author in 1997 [12] , which is proved now equivalent to the nilpotent minimum logic, NM for short, introduced by the authors of [1] .
Definition 2.1 [14] . Suppose that S = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} is a countable set of propositional variables. The set F(S) of well-formed formulas over L Ã is defined inductively as follows: each propositional variable p 2 S is a formula; if A and B are formulas, then :A, A _ B and A ! B are formulas, where : is a unary operator, and _ and ! are binary ones respectively.
The simplified axiom schemes of L Ã given in [14] are as follows: 
(ii) Let C be a theory, A 2 F(S). A deduction of A from C, in symbols, C ' A, is a finite sequence of formulas A 1 , . . . , A n = A such that for each 1 6 i 6 n, either A i is an axiom, or A i 2 C, or there are j, k 2 {1, . . . , i À 1} such that A i follows from A j and A k by MP. Equivalently, we say that A is a consequence of C. The set of all consequences of C is denoted by D(C). By a proof of A we shall henceforth mean a deduction of A from the empty set. We shall also write 'A in place of ; ' A and A will be called to be a theorem.
(iii) Let A, B 2 F(S). If 'A ! B and ' B ! A hold, then A and B are called provably equivalent. (iv) A theory C & F(S) is called inconsistent if C ' 0, otherwise, consistent, where 0 is a refutable formula (or contradiction), i.e., ' : 0 holds.
The classical deduction theorem is one of the most important theorem in classical twovalued logic system, and it says that
Because the left-to-right direction of the classical deduction theorem above depends on the following axiom of classical logic:
which is not assumed in L Ã , it is no longer valid in L Ã . Fortunately, it has been proved that there exists in L Ã a weak form of the deduction theorem (here called generalized deduction theorem) [9] .
Theorem 2.4 [9] . Suppose that C is a theory, A, B 2 F(S), then in L Ã holds the following generalized deduction theorem:
It is easy to check that (A&B) ! C and A ! (B ! C) are provably equivalent, hence by the definition of deduction, the above generalized deduction theorem in L Ã can be described equivalently as:
The following is about the semantics of L Ã . Let N : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] be a strong negation (i.e., an involutive function such that N(0) = 1). Define a binary operator N : [0, 1] 2 ! [0, 1] as follows:
where x^y = min(x, y), x, y 2 [0, 1]. The operator N is called a nilpotent minimum. Clearly, the operator N is a left-continuous t-norm, thus we can obtain the corresponding residuum of N R N : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] as follows:
Particularly, if N is a standard strong negation : : ½0; 1 ! ½0; 1; :x ¼ 1 À x, then the operator N is called the standard nilpotent minimum, and we obtain the so-called R 0 implication operator and the corresponding t-norm (see [12, 14] ):
Based on the R 0 implication operator and on the background of L Ã -Lindenbaum algebra, the second author proposed the R 0 -algebra [14] , which is an algebraic structure equivalent to NM-algebra [1] .
Definition 2.5 [14] . Let M be an algebra of type ð:; _; !Þ, where : is a unary operator, _ and ! are binary operations. If there is a partial order 6 such that (M, 6) is a bounded lattice, _ is the supremum operation with respect to 6, : is an order-reversing involution, and the following conditions hold for any x, y, z 2 M.
For example, define on [0, 1] a unary operator and two binary operator as follows:
; 1g with the operations :; _; ! as defined in the standard R 0 -algebra is also a R 0 -algebra, denoted by R n .
Definition 2.6. Let ð½0; 1; :; _; !Þ be the standard R 0 -algebra, A 2 F(S).
The set of all valuations will be denoted by X.
It has been proved that the algebraic semantic and the syntax of L Ã are in perfect harmony, i.e. the standard completeness theorem holds in L Ã .
Theorem 2.7 [10] . "A 2 F(S) in L Ã , A is a theorem iff A is a tautology.
To grade the truth degrees of formulas in L Ã , the second author proposed the concept of integrated truth degrees of formulas [16] .
Let A = A(p 1 , . . . , p m ) be a formula of R 0 -logic whose all propositional variables are among p 1 , . . . , p m . Then the value of
. It must be stressed that this has sense only in standard semantics of R 0 -logic (luckily, this logic, more precisely the NM-logic, is standard complete).
Definition 2.8 [16] . Suppose that A(p 1 , . . . , p m ) is a formula in L Ã , define sðAÞ ¼
then s(A) is called the integrated truth degree of A.
Now we are ready to investigate the n-valued R 0 logic L Ã n .
Definition 2.9 [11] . (i) The axioms of the (2n
. . . ;
. . . . and {C n } is an arbitrary sequence of formulas.
If it is not necessary to state whether n is odd or even, we denote the above extension by L Ã n ; n P 2. The inference rule of L Ã n is MP. The definitions of theories, theorems and deductions of L Ã n are almost the same as those of L Ã . For example, a theory C over L Ã n is a set of formulas. C ' A (or, more precisely, C ' n A) means that A is provable in C, i.e., there is a L Ã n -proof in C (a finite sequence each of whose members either is an axiom of L Ã n , or an element of C or follows from some preceding members by MP.) Moreover, since L Ã n is an extension of L Ã , the generalized deduction theorem of L Ã also holds in L Ã n , i.e.,
Similarly for a formula A = A(p 1 , . . . , p m ) 2 F(S), A induces a function A : R m n ! R n in the natural way. D.W. Pei and S.M. Wang has now proved that L Ã n is complete w.r.t. R n [11] .
Theorem 2.10 [15] . L Ã n ðn P 2Þ is complete, i.e., "A 2 F(S), A is a theorem iff A is a tautology.
Truth degrees of formulas in L Ã
n In this section we extend the idea of [15] to L Ã n and introduce the concept of truth degrees of formulas in L Ã n . Suppose that X k ¼ f0; 1 nÀ1 ; . . . ; nÀ2 nÀ1 ; 1g and l k is the evenly distributed probability measure on X k , i.e., l k ð;
. . . . Assume that X ¼ Q 1 k¼1 X k and l is the infinite product of l 1 , l 2 , . . . [5] . Let v 2 X n , then v is determined by its restriction vjS because F(S)/$ (where $ is the relation of ''logical equivalence in the logic L Ã '') is the free algebra generated by S. Assume that v(p k ) = v k (k = 1,2,. . .), then an infinite dimensional vector v
. . .Þ be any element of X ¼ Q 1 k¼1 X k , then there exists a unique v 2 X n such that v(p k ) = v k (k = 1,2,. . .). Hence there exists a bijection u :
Definition 3.1. The above-mentioned mapping is called the measurized mapping of X n .
; v 2 X n g is the class of i nÀ1 -models of A, i = 0,1,. . . , n À 1. Then s n (A) is called the n-valued truth degree of A.
(ii) Let p and q be two different propositional variables, and v 2 X n , then vðp^qÞ ¼ i nÀ1 iff vðpÞ ¼ i nÀ1 and vðqÞ P i nÀ1 , or vðqÞ ¼ i nÀ1 and vðpÞ > i nÀ1 ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n À 1Þ. Since there are a total of n 2 pairs of (v(p), v(q)) and among then only 2(n À i) À 1 v's imply that
By a similar analysis one can obtain
Consider the truth degree s n (p ! q) of p ! q. Note that vðp ! qÞ ¼ vðpÞ ! vðqÞ ¼ R 0 ðvðpÞ; vðqÞÞ ¼ 1; vðpÞ 6 vðqÞ; ð1 À vðpÞÞ _ vðqÞ; vðpÞ > vðqÞ:
Let v(p ! q) = 1, then v(p) 6 v(q), there a total of ½n þ ðn À 1Þ þ Á Á Á þ 1 ¼ nðnþ1Þ
It is easy to check that there are a total of (n À 1) solutions if i ¼ nÀ1 2 and n is odd, (2i + 1) ones if i < nÀ1 2 and n is odd, 2(n À 1 À i) ones if i > nÀ1 2 and n is odd, and (2i + 1) ones if i 6 nÀ1 2 and n is even, 2(n À 1 À i) ones if i > nÀ1 2 and n is even. Thus, if n is odd, then
and if n is even, then
(iv) Now, to calculate the truth degree s n (p 2 ) of p 2 ¼ :ðp ! :pÞ in L Ã n . 8v 2 X n , let vðp 2 Þ ¼ i nÀ1 , i.e., vðpÞ vðpÞ ¼ i nÀ1 ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n À 1, where is the nilpotent minimum t-norm adjoint to the R 0 implication operator defined above.
n is odd, 3nÀ2 8ðnÀ1Þ ; n is even.
(
(v) It is left to the reader to check that s n ðp 1^p2^Á Á Á^p m Þ ¼ 1 n m ðnÀ1Þ P nÀ1 k¼1 k m . In the sequel, we give the following lemma summarizing the basic properties of the truth degree function s n , and the proof is obvious and omitted. then q n is a pseudo-metric on F(S).
From Lemma 3.4 one may see that the truth degree function s n looks like a valuation of F(S), but it is not the case. Indeed, as shown in Example 3.3(i) and (ii), s n does not commute with the min-conjunction. s n is actually an intrinsic means to measure the size of the model class of a formula.
What is the relationship between the two truth degree functions s n and s when n converges to infinity? The following limit theorem answers the above question. Proof. Although the implication operator R 0 is not continuous on [0, 1] 2 , the set of its discontinuity points is of zero-measure. So the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 of [15] and is omitted. h Solution. (i) sðpÞ ¼
These results together with the corresponding ones of Example 3.3 further verify Theorem 3.5.
Consistency degrees of theories based on deduction theorems in L Ã
n First let us take an analysis on the inconsistency of a theory in L Ã n . Suppose that C is a theory and C is inconsistent, then the contradiction 0 is a consequence of C, that is to say, C' n 0 holds. It follows from the generalized deduction theorem that there exists a finite string of formulas ! 0 holds, hence by the generalized deduction theorem of L Ã n ; C' n 0 holds, and so C is inconsistent. From the above analysis, in order to decide whether a given theory C is inconsistent or not, it suffices to calculate the truth degrees s n ðA 2 1 & Á Á Á &A 2 m ! 0Þ of all possible formulas of the form
If the truth degree of such a formula is equal to 1, then C is inconsistent. However, it may happen during our reasoning that we obtain more truth degrees of such formulas from C and it is necessary to decide, which of them should be taken as the result. By the completeness theorem of L Ã n , the larger the truth degrees of such formulas are, the closer C is to be inconsistent. Therefore, it is natural and reasonable for us using the supremum of truth degrees of all formulas with the form 
m ¼ 0;
( and define l n ðCÞ ¼ supfs n ðR 2 ! 0Þ j R 2 2 ðCÞ g.
(iii) Since ' ðp 2 1 & Á Á Á &p 2 m Þ ! ðp 1^Á Á Á p m Þ holds in L Ã , it also holds in the n-valued extension L Ã n of L Ã . Following from Lemma 3.4 and Example 3.3,
. . . ; p m 2 S; m 2 Ng P 1 À inffs n ðp 1^Á Á Á^p m Þ j p 1 ; . . . ; p m 2 S; m 2 Ng
and so l n (S) = 1. But C = S is not inconsistent. In fact, suppose on the contrary that C is inconsistent, then C' n 0. Hence it follows from the generalized deduction theorem of L Ã n that there exist p 1 , . . . , p m 2 C such that ' n p 2
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4.5. Let C be a theory in L Ã n . If C is inconsistent then l n (C) = 1, but not vice versa.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and so omitted. For counterexample, please see Example 4.4(iii). h
From the analysis at the beginning of this section, we know that l n (C) is an ideal index to measure the inconsistency degree of C. Perhaps this hints the idea that one may define the consistency degree consist n (C) of C to be 1 À l n (C), but this idea has a shortcoming that it could not distinguish theories with l n (C) = 1 from inconsistent theories as shown in Example 4.4 and Theorem 4.5. Hence we have to revise the seemingly reasonable definition consist n (C) = 1 À l n (C). and i n (C) is called the polar index of C in L Ã n .
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that C is a theory of L Ã n . Then (i) C is consistent iff i n (C) = 0, (ii) C is inconsistent iff i n (C) = 1.
Proof. Since the concept of consistency of a theory is crisp rather than fuzzy, and i n (C) 2 {0, 1}, it suffices to prove (ii). Suppose that C is inconsistent, i.e., C ' 0 then by the generalized deduction theorem of L Ã n , there exist A 1 , . . . , A m 2 C such that A 2 1 & Á Á Á &A 2 m ! 0 is a theorem, and it follows from the completeness theorem of L Ã n and Lemma 3.4 that s n ðA 2
Again by completeness theorem of L Ã n and Lemma 3.4, ' n A 2 1 & Á Á Á &A 2 m ! 0 holds. Therefore C' n 0 holds by MP 2m times, and hence C is inconsistent. h Proof. (i) It is easy to check that C is a useless theory iff l n (C) = 0, hence (i) holds.
(ii) On account of Theorem 4.7(i) C is consistent iff i n (C) = 0, and this is equivalent to 1 2 6 consit n ðCÞ ¼ 1 À 1 2 l n ðCÞ 6 1. (iii) It follows directly from Definition 4.8 and Theorem 4.7(i). (iv) Suppose that C is inconsistent, then l n (C) = 1 by Theorem 4.5 and i n (C) = 1 by Theorem 4.7(ii). Hence consist n ðCÞ ¼ 1 À 1 2 Â 1 Â ð1 þ 1Þ ¼ 0. Conversely, if C is consistent, then by (ii) 1 2 6 consist n ðCÞ 6 1, a contradiction. h It must be stressed that item (i) says C is a useless theory iff the elements of D(C) are tautologies. This means that, passing through the completeness theorem, all the consequences of C are logical theorems, or all the special axioms of C are indeed logical theorems. In this sense each theory with consist n (C) = 1 is quite useless.
Example 4.10. One has got in Example 4.4 that l n ð;Þ ¼ 0; l n ðfpgÞ ¼ 5nþ1 8n if n is odd, l n ðfpgÞ ¼ 5nÀ6 8ðnÀ1Þ if n is even, and l n (S) = 1. It is routine to check that these three theories are all consistent. This means that i n (;) = i n ({p}) = i n (S) = 0. Hence one easily gets that consist n ð;Þ ¼ 1;
consist n ðfpgÞÞ ¼ Now calculate consist n (C) for C ¼ fp; :pg. Since p&:p is a contradiction ðvðp&:pÞ ¼ vðpÞ ð1 À vðpÞÞ ¼ 0Þ and p&:p 2 DðCÞ, C is inconsistent by the standard completeness theorem of L Ã n . Hence consist n (C) = 0.
Remark 4.11. Corresponding to the Limit Theorem (Theorem 3.5) in Section 3, here is a similar limit theorem for l n (C): lim n!1 l n ðCÞ ¼ lðCÞ.
But lim n!1 i n ðCÞ ¼ iðCÞ does not hold. As for the definitions of l(C) and i(C) in L Ã we refer to [20] .
Methods of graded reasoning in L Ã n
As has been pointed out in Remark 4.2(iv), Definition 4.1 indeed offers a method to evaluate the extent to which the contradiction 0 is a consequence of a theory C.
If we replace 0 by a general formula A, then the corresponding analysis at the beginning of Section 4 also holds in L Ã n . Hence we get a method to evaluate the extent to which a formula A is a consequence of a given theory C.
Definition 5.1. Suppose that C is a theory of L Ã n ; 2 ðCÞ is the set of all finite subsets of C, R = {A 1 , . . . , A m } 2 2 (C) , and A 2 F(S) is a formula. Let
( and define l n ðA; CÞ ¼ supfs n ðR 2 ! AÞ j R 2 2 ðCÞ g.
Then l n (A, C) is called the degree of entailment of A from C, or say A is a consequence of C in the degree l n (A, C).
Note that Remark 4.2 also holds when 0 is replaced by A, and clearly l n ð 0; CÞ ¼ l n ðCÞ. Similar to Theorem 4.5, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let A be not a theorem of L Ã n and let C be a theory of L Ã n . If A is a consequence of C then l n (A, C) = 1, but not vice versa.
Clearly Theorem 4.5 is a special case of Theorem 5.2. It is not difficult to check that sup{s n (R 2 ! A)jR 2 2 (C) } P sup{s n (p 2^Á Á Á^p m ! p 1 )jm 2 N} = 1, where C = {p 2^Á Á Á^p m jm = 2,3,. . .} and A = p 1 , and it is routine to show that A 6 2 DðCÞ. Theorem 5.2 tells us that l n (A, C) = 1 does not mean A is (100%) a consequence of C. and also call l Ã n ðA; CÞ the degree of entailment of A from C, or say A is consequence of C in the degree l Ã n ðA; CÞ.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose that C is a theory of L Ã n ; A 2 F ðSÞ, then Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4.9 and so omitted. h
In the following, we give another method of graded reasoning in L Ã n by evaluating the distance of A to D(C). and call A a consequence of C with error a.
The following theorem reveals the relationship between q n and l n .
Theorem 5.8. Let C be a theory of L Ã n ; A 2 F ðSÞ, then q n ðA; DðCÞÞ P 1 À l n ðA; CÞ. Proof q n ðA; DðCÞÞ ¼ inffq n ðA; BÞ j B 2 DðCÞg ¼ inff1 À s n ððA ! BÞ^ðB ! AÞÞ j B 2 DðCÞg ¼ 1 À supfs n ððA ! BÞ^ðB ! AÞÞ j B 2 DðCÞg P 1 À supfs n ðB ! AÞ j B 2 DðCÞg P 1 À supfs n ðA 2 1 & Á Á Á &A 2 m ! AÞ j A 1 ; . . . ; A m 2 C; m 2 Ng ¼ 1 À l n ðA; CÞ: Ã Corollary 5.9. Suppose that C is a theory of L Ã n ; A 2 F ðSÞ, if A 2 o(D(C)), i.e., q n (A, D(C)) = 0 but A 6 2 DðCÞ, then l Ã n ðA; CÞ ¼ 1 2 .
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 5.8, Definition 5.5 and Theorem 5.6. h
Concluding remarks
In the present paper we firstly extended the idea of [15] to L Ã n and we proposed the concept of truth degrees of formulas, then based on deduction theorem, completeness theorem, we defined a consistency function measuring the extent to which a general theory is inconsistent. Two methods of graded reasoning in L Ã n were given and the relationship between them was discussed.
So far, we have successfully established the theory of consistency degrees of theories in classical two-valued and fuzzy logic systems, and the n-valued extension L Ã n of the formal deductive system L Ã . It must be stressed that the presented results can be easily adapted to any standard complete finite-valued logic system such as Ł n (which is standard complete with respect to the standard MV n -chain, see [2] ). More precisely, in Ł n we only need to define R n ! 0 ¼ A n 1 & Á Á Á &A n m ! 0 if m > 0, and R n ! 0 ¼ 0 otherwise, instead of R 2 ! 0 defined in L Ã n , because it is easy to check that the generalized deduction theorem: C [ {A} ' B iff C ' A n ! B, holds in Ł n . The following work is the same as in L Ã n . For example, we can also prove Theorems 4.5, 4.7, and 4.9. Maybe some computation of l n will be altered, such as l n ðfpgÞ ¼ 1 À 1 n in Ł n , which is not equal to the expression of l n ({p}) in L Ã n . Moreover, how to extend the concept of consistency degrees of theories and the method of graded reasoning to predicate logic systems and to the more general fuzzy logic system with graded syntax given in [7] would be a more attractive research.
